Language, Intelligence, and Thought by Robin Barrow

Author:Robin Barrow
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 978-1-317-40648-8
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd

Notes and references

1. John Gingell argues that we could still talk usefully of, e.g., relatively intelligent footballers, circus clowns, and scholars. So we could, but that is to show only that the word ‘intelligent’ still has utility. It does nothing to refute the point that the concept of intelligence, on these terms, would be too broad to discriminate usefully. (It should be added, for the benefit of my readers who cannot otherwise be expected to know it, that Dr Gingell is not much in sympathy with the idea of a general concept of intelligence anyway. He tends to the view that, while there are common factors that explain why, e.g., we call a particular general and a particular footballer intelligent, there is no particular reason to imagine that there is such a thing as a general notion of intelligence common to both. (Very Wittgensteinian!). I agree with the latter point but then I do not think that the way we use the word ‘intelligent’ of persons in particular roles (e.g., intelligent footballer) is entirely parallel to the way we use ‘intelligence’. Be that as it may, I am not as interested in the question of what it makes sense to assume ‘Bobby Charlton was an intelligent footballer’ means, as I am in what it makes sense to assume ‘Bobby Charlton was an intelligent man’ means. Certainly the two can be distinguished. Bobby Charlton may be both an intelligent footballer and an intelligent man. Others may be either one, without necessarily being the other.)

2. I veer between thinking this unproblematic and thinking that it may need further argument As a back-up to the text, let me first emphasize that I am not making a decisive distinction between rational understanding and, e.g., understanding of people or art. I believe, as I say in the main text, that rational understanding is a large component in understanding art and people. Secondly, I should at least acknowledge that I am aware that it does not seem self-evident to everybody, as it does to me, that appreciation of art, ability to get on with people, empathy with nature, and some form of religious faith are not in themselves relevant to judgements of intelligence.

Thirdly, this would be a good point at which to refer to Howard Gardner and his theory of multiple intelligences, since to some the thesis represents a middle way between the Scylla of a general notion of intelligence and the Charybdis of a never ending list of specific competencies. To me, unfortunately, it doesn’t, since what interests me is the idea of a general notion of intelligence. I do not dispute (I am not in fact in a position to dispute) Gardner’s claim that empirical data suggest that individuals may be more or less competent in seven distinct areas, which he calls ‘intelligences’ (logical-mathematical; linguistic; spatial; bodily-kinaesthetic; musical; interpersonal; intrapersonal). But this has little to do, for reasons emphasized in the first three chapters, with my interest, which is in the conceptual question of whether there seems reason to insist that, e.

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